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Abstract
In Spence’s (1973) signaling by education model and in many of its extensions,
firms can only infer workers’ productivities from their education choices. In reality,
firms also use sophisticated pre–employment auditing to learn workers’ produc-
tivities. We characterize the trade–offs between signaling by workers and costly
information acquisition by firms. Information acquisition is always associated with
(partial) pooling of worker types, and education is used as a signal only if relatively
few workers have low productivity. Our analysis applies also to other signaling
problems, e.g. the financial structure of firms, warranties, and initial public offerings.
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1 Introduction
We investigate signaling in a market where the uninformed side of the market relies not
only on informative signaling by the other side, but may itself acquire information by
performing costly audits. Agents on the informed side of the market privately know their
types and can choose publicly observable actions to signal their types. The uninformed
agents make offers based on observed actions. But these offers are non–binding in the
sense that an application may be rejected if an audit discovers unfavorable information.
Our model thus extends the canonical model of Spence (1973), in which signaling is
the only source of information provision. We analyze the trade–offs between signaling
by informed agents and information acquisition by uninformed agents. These trade-offs
occur because in our model information acquisition is endogenously determined as part
of the equilibrium.1 We fully characterize the set of equilibria and point out novel features
of signaling in markets where the uninformed side has the option to invest in information
acquisition.
For our analysis, we use the framing of the labor market setting by Spence (1973),
who first proposed education as a signaling device in labor markets: workers have private
information about their own productivity, education is more costly for low than for high
productivity workers and therefore can be used to signal productivities. Hence, firms can
only infer workers’ productivities from their education choices. In reality, besides looking
at the workers’ education, firms use sophisticated testing, assessment centers and other
instruments of auditing to learn workers’ productivities.2
We combine these two features: workers have the option of signaling through educa-
tion and firms have the option of conducting costly information acquisition by auditing
workers. In particular, workers choose their education level and then firms announce
wages as in Spence’s (1973) model. After a worker applies for a wage for some education
level, firms choose whether or not to audit the applicant and then decide on hiring. We
assume that an audit reveals a worker’s type to the firm; but auditing is non–verifiable
and firms cannot pre–commit to auditing. We are interested in the strategic interaction
between workers’ signaling incentives and firms’ auditing incentives. Although we frame
our model and results in terms of labor market signaling, our analysis also applies to other
1This distinguishes our analysis from models (see the related literature review below) where in addition
to signaling some exogenous information is available.
2According to Dessler (2017, p. 210), more than 67 percent of employers tested applicants for various
skills. There is a huge literature about common testing and auditing procedures for applicants. See, for ex-
ample, Noe et al. (2018, Ch. 6), Armstrong and Taylor (2017, p. 254-263), Dessler (2017, Ch. 6), or Martin
(2012, p. 207-208, p. 216-219).
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signaling environments, as we point out below.
When the option of auditing is unavailable, the most prominent equilibrium is the
least–cost separating equilibrium in which workers with low and high productivity choose
different education levels. When firms can audit applicants, firms acquire information
only when there is enough uncertainty and they have diffuse beliefs about workers’ types.
Given degenerate beliefs, firms have no incentives to audit workers. As a result, the least–
cost separating equilibrium is also supported when firms have the option to audit, and
auditing does not occur in this equilibrium. However, this may not be a plausible out-
come when auditing costs are small and it is more efficient for firms to incur the auditing
costs than for workers to signal through education. We adopt an extension by Bester and
Ritzberger (2001) of the intuitive criterion of Cho and Kreps (1987) to refine beliefs and
rule out such counterintuitive equilibria.3 Then, we show that there is a unique equilib-
rium. When auditing costs are large, the least–cost separating equilibrium is the unique
outcome, different types of workers choose different education levels and auditing does
not occur in equilibrium; when auditing costs are small, the unique equilibrium outcome
is a partial pooling one, and firms audit with positive probability.
The equilibrium results are intuitive. In a competitive market, firms’ expected profits
are driven down to zero in equilibrium. Workers with high productivity benefit from in-
formation revelation by being recognized as high types, and receive a wage equal to their
productivity subtracting expected costs of information acquisition. Information about
workers’ types is revealed either through workers’ costly education or through the firms’
costly auditing. With either channel, high types effectively bear the expected costs. For
large auditing cost, information revelation is relatively cheap through signaling; hence,
high productivity workers have an incentive to signal their type through education; when
auditing costs are small, expected auditing costs passed through to high types are rela-
tively small, and it is beneficial for them to refrain from signaling and to rely on firms’
audits instead.
The equilibrium has interesting features. When auditing costs are relatively small,
the least–cost separating equilibrium cannot be supported, and the more plausible par-
tial pooling equilibrium uniquely survives our belief refinement. When there are many
high–productivity workers, our equilibrium is a partial pooling one in which some high–
productivity workers signal through education while the remaining pool with low types
on zero education, and firms audit some of the workers with zero education. High–
productivity workers’ education decreases as their education costs increase or as auditing
costs decrease. For sufficiently small auditing costs, workers pool at zero education and
3See Section 4 for more details and a discussion.
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no worker uses education as a signal in equilibrium. With vanishing auditing costs, the
pooling equilibrium becomes more and more informative and converges to the complete
information outcome: workers’ expected payoffs converge to their productivities. Fur-
thermore, both types’ payoffs are (sometimes strictly) higher in the pooling equilibrium
with auditing than their respective payoffs in the separating equilibrium without auditing.
Therefore, when firms can audit rather cheaply, workers indeed prefer not to signal.
Our contribution can be helpful for analyzing other environments that involve strate-
gic interactions between signaling and costly information acquisition. Consider, for ex-
ample, the model of Leland and Pyle (1977) in which entrepreneurs seek to sell their
projects to investors. Each entrepreneur has private information about the future rev-
enues of his project. As Leland and Pyle (1977) show, the equity participation of the
entrepreneur can then be a signal of the project’s quality. This is so because high–quality
entrepreneurs have a higher incentive to retain a share of the revenues than low–quality
entrepreneurs. Suppose now that investors can obtain information not only from observ-
ing the entrepreneur’s equity share but also by auditing project quality. Our findings then
indicate that in an equilibrium where investors invest in auditing, signaling plays a role
only if the market share of high–quality projects is sufficiently high.
As another application, consider warranties. Sellers are privately informed about
product quality, but they can offer warranties to signal the quality of their product. Offer-
ing warranties is costly, as products break down (Spence, 1977) or as they induce moral
hazard on behalf of buyers (Lutz, 1989). In each case, offering a warranty is more ex-
pensive for sellers of low-quality products. Buyers observe the warranties and compete
by placing bids. Suppose now that buyers have the option to inspect the product’s qual-
ity in addition to inferring it from the warranties. Our results then suggest that in any
equilibrium with inspection sellers use less warranties as a signaling device than classical
signaling models without inspections would imply. This is in line with the “mixed con-
clusions” of the empirical literature about warranties as signals of product quality (Riley,
2001, p. 455).
Finally, consider initial public offerings (IPOs). In the IPO process, the choice of in-
vestment bankers and board members may be a signal of firm value to potential investors
(see, e.g., Titman and Trueman (1986) and Certo, Daily, and Dalton (2001) for theoreti-
cal analysis and empirical evidence). Prestigious investment bankers and board members,
who are more accurate at evaluating information about the firm, are more costly. But,
owners of high–value firms are willing to pay a premium for hiring them to avoid under-
pricing. Our analysis suggests that for those IPOs where potential investors can learn the
true firm value at relatively low cost, the firms may reduce their usage of high–cost agents
3
to signal firm value.
Related Literature
Our work contributes to the signaling literature by incorporating the option of costly in-
formation acquisition into the otherwise standard setup.4 Costly information acquisition
is a very natural scenario in the recruiting and hiring process in the labor market, and it
has been studied extensively but in isolation of the signaling aspect so far.5 In the com-
bined model, we are able to offer some interesting observations on the trade–offs between
workers’ signaling incentives and firms’ auditing incentives.
The paper is related to the literature on job market signaling when firms have some ad-
ditional information about workers’ productivities. Alos–Ferrer and Prat (2012) analyze a
dynamic model in which the firm is able to extract information from noisy realizations of
the worker’s productivity after the worker is hired. In contrast, in our model firms can au-
dit the worker’s type before hiring. Feltovich, Harbaugh and To (2002) consider a model
where, prior to making job offers, employers have access to grades and other information
that is correlated with workers’ productivity in addition to observing the education choices
by workers. They point out countersignaling equilibria: only workers with intermediate
productivity signal via education, while low and high productivity workers pool at zero
education. Daley and Green (2014) fully characterize the equilibria of such a model and
extend it in various directions. Kurlat and Scheuer (2018) study a competitive equilib-
rium model with firms that are heterogeneous in their precision of evaluating additional
information. In these papers, firms’ information is exogenous and non–strategic, while
in our model, information acquisition is strategic and firms have the option whether to
conduct costly audits or not.6
Our paper complements other applications of signaling games with information ac-
quisition. Banks (1992) analyzes a setup where the monopolist knows ex ante its true
marginal cost of production, the regulator observes the market price proposed by the
monopolist and decides whether to verify the monopolist’s marginal cost and impose a
regulatory price for the monopoly product. Bester and Ritzberger (2001) study the envi-
ronment where a monopolist uses pricing to signal product quality and consumers may
4See Kreps and Sobel (1994) and Riley (2001) for a review on the role of signaling and its applications
in different fields.
5See, for example, Guasch and Weiss (1981). In their model, there is no signaling, auditing is con-
tractible and is used together with the wage scheme as a self-selection device. We differ from them by
examining a model with signaling by education and unobservable and thus non–contractible auditing. See
also the references in footnote 2.
6Prat (2002) considers signaling with additional exogenous information in a voting model.
4
acquire additional information about product quality.7 Mayzlin and Shin (2011) consider
a setting where a firm strategically chooses the message content of costless advertisement
to (not) reveal aspects of the product’s quality, and consumers can acquire additional in-
formation about the product’s quality before purchasing. Stahl and Strausz (2017) ana-
lyze a setting in which buyers decide whether to acquire costly third party certification to
verify the quality of the product on observing the prices posted by the seller. Garfagnini
(2017) analyses a setup in which the career-concerned worker signals his type through
overtime at work and the firm exercises oversight to identify low ability workers. These
applications typically have very different features from the competitive job market signal-
ing environment we focus on.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains the setup combining job-market
signaling and costly auditing. In Section 3, we characterize the relation between firms’
beliefs, the equilibrium wage and firms’ incentive to audit for different auditing costs. In
Section 4, we present the extension of the intuitive criterion that we will use to refine the
equilibria. Section 5 and 6 fully characterize the set of equilibria and show uniqueness of
the separating and the pooling equilibrium. Discussions and extensions can be found in
Section 7. Section 8 contains the concluding remarks. All formal proofs are relegated to
an appendix.
2 The Model
We consider the following adaptation of the Spence (1973) signaling model, in which
workers choose education as a signal and then firms compete for workers. There is a unit
mass of workers, who differ in their innate productivity. We restrict attention to the case
of two types, i ∈ {L, H}, of workers. A fraction 1− λ ∈ (0,1) of workers has type L and
productivity X L > 0; the remaining fraction λ has type H and productivity XH > X L. Each
worker’s productivity is private information.
Before entering the job market, workers can choose an education level y ≥ 0, which
is publicly observable. The cost of education ci(y) is type dependent. We follow the
consensus in the literature and assume that





for all y > 0. Thus, for any y > 0, type L has higher education costs than type H. If type i
with education choice y is employed at the wage w, his utility is w− ci(y).
7Note that in Bester and Ritzberger (2001) the informed seller makes price offers, whereas in our setting
the uninformed firms offer wages.
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There are at least two firms with constant returns to scale so that each firm faces
no restrictions on the mass of workers that it can employ. Firms a priori only observe a
worker’s education choice y , but not his type. They, however, can choose to learn the type
of a job applicant at the cost k > 0, and then make their hiring decision contingent on
the observed type.8 Information acquisition is not observable: whether a firm audits an
applicant’s type and if so which information it obtains is the firm’s private information.9
Therefore, firms cannot commit to pre–employment audits and they cannot make their
wage offers contingent on their auditing choice and observation. Also, workers cannot
pay firms for being audited to receive a public certification of their productivity. When a
firm employs a worker of type i at the wage w, its profit is X i − w− k if it has performed
an audit before hiring, and X i −w without an audit. If after auditing the firm decides not
to hire the applicant, it incurs the loss −k.
Firms compete by making wage offers and so in equilibrium each firm will earn zero
expected profit. Therefore, it is always optimal for a firm to offer the ‘default’ wage wL ≡ X L
and to hire all applicants, independently of their education, at wL without an audit.
10
Obviously, if a worker decides to apply for the default wage, it is not optimal to acquire
education. In contrast to the default wage, we assume that all wage offers w > X L are
non–binding in the sense that the firm remains entitled to reject any application at–will.11
For any offer w ∈ (X L, XH], therefore, if the firm decides not to perform an audit, it
optimally hires the applicant as long as his expected productivity is not below the wage w.
In contrast, with auditing a firm will hire type H and reject type L. It is publicly observable
when a worker’s application for w ∈ (X L, XH] is rejected. All firms then believe that this
worker is of type L, and therefore he can apply anew only for the default wage wL.
12 But,
for the renewed application the worker pays a delay or switching cost s ∈ (0, X L).13
Workers who decide not to choose the default wage, select some education y ≥ 0.
After observing education choices, firms compete by offering a wage w(y) for workers
with education y . Obviously, their offers will depend on the belief about the average pro-
ductivity of these workers. Also, as we show in the next section, their belief is important
8For example, Guasch and Weiss (1981, p. 275) write that a “common practice is for firms to offer a
wage for a given job classification, and to test applicants.”
9For a model where testing job applications is contractible, see e.g. Guasch and Weiss (1981).
10As we discuss in Section 7, the availability of the default wage simplifies the specification of the firms’
beliefs in a perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
11In Section 7, we show that our results remain robust when the firms can also make binding offers to
hire all applicants.
12Of course, these beliefs will turn out to be consistent with the equilibrium outcome.
13If workers discount future wages by the factor δ ∈ (0, 1), then s = (1−δ)X L for being hired at wL = X L
at date 2 and not being hired immediately at date 1.
6
for the firms’ decisions on information acquisition. We denote by µ(y) ∈ [0,1] the firms’
belief that a fraction µ(y) has type H among all workers who have chosen education y
and apply for w(y).
The signaling and auditing game has the following sequence of events:
(i) Workers privately observe their type, L or H.
(ii) Workers either choose some education y ≥ 0 or opt for the default wage wL = X L.
(iii) Firms compete by offering wages w(y) for each education y chosen by some work-
ers.
(iv) Workers with education y choose at which offer w(y) to apply.
(v) Firms take auditing decisions based on their belief µ(y) and then decide on hiring.
(vi) After a worker is rejected by a firm, he receives the wage wL, but incurs the cost s.
In this setting, firms combine job advertisements with wage offers and then decide on
auditing job applicants. This sequence of events looks quite natural in many labor mar-
kets. Indeed, in their handbook on personnel management Armstrong and Taylor (2017,
p. 248) point out that the first step of the recruiting process is to define job requirements
including “terms and conditions (pay, benefits, . . . )”.14 After attracting candidates the
next steps are sifting applications, interviewing, testing, assessing candidates, obtaining
references and checking applications.
In what follows, we analyze the perfect Bayesian equilibrium of this game. To simplify
the exposition, we assume that all firms have identical out–of–equilibrium beliefs. Further,
whenever a wage offer attracts workers, the average productivity of applicants for this
wage is the same for all firms that make this offer. We say that an equilibrium is unique if
the workers’ education choices and all wage offers that attract a positive mass of workers
are uniquely determined.
3 Wages and Information Acquisition
We first analyze how the firms’ equilibrium wage offers and their decisions on information
acquisition depend on the belief µ(y) about workers with education y . Let ρ(y) ∈ [0, 1]
denote the probability that a worker applying for w(y) will be audited. Obviously, if the
14Martin (2012, p. 200-201) confirms that the “job announcement should include . . . the salary and ben-
efits attached to the position.”
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cost of information acquisition is too high, auditing cannot occur in equilibrium. Indeed,
the following result shows that this is the case if the auditing cost k is above the critical
level
k˜ ≡ XH − X L
4
. (2)
With this definition, we obtain the following observation on firms’ equilibrium wage offer
and auditing decision for high auditing cost:
Lemma 1 Let k > k˜. Then in equilibrium, firms offer w(y) = X L + µ(y)(XH − X L) and
choose ρ(y) = 0 after observing education y.
By offering a wage w(y) > wL = X L firms compete for high productivity workers.
Given their belief µ(y), they face the trade–off of incurring auditing costs and hiring
type H only, or saving the auditing cost and hiring both types. With auditing, the com-
petitive wage, at which firms make zero profits, equals XH − k/µ(y) because only a frac-
tion µ(y) of all workers is expected to have type H and the auditing cost is passed through
to these workers. Without auditing, the competitive wage equals the average productivity
X L +µ(y)(XH − X L) because both types are hired. As long as k > k˜, the average produc-
tivity is higher than the wage for type H with auditing irrespective of the belief µ(y).
Therefore, competition precludes that firms invest in information acquisition.
Now consider the case k ≤ k˜. In this case, the equation k = µ(1 − µ)(XH − X L) has





XH − X L − 4k
XH − X L
1/2




XH − X L − 4k
XH − X L
1/2
. (3)
Note that µ1(k˜) = µ2(k˜) = 1/2, and 0 < µ1(k) < 1/2 < µ2(k) < 1 if k < k˜. Further, for
k ∈ (0, k˜)
µ′1(k)> 0, µ1(0) = 0, µ
′
2(k)< 0, µ2(0) = 1. (4)
The following Lemma describes how the firms’ equilibrium behavior depends on their
beliefs when auditing costs are sufficiently small.
Lemma 2 Let k ≤ k˜. Then, after observing education y, in equilibrium:
(i) if µ(y) /∈ [µ1(k),µ2(k)], firms offer w(y) = X L +µ(y)(XH − X L) and choose ρ(y) = 0.
(ii) if µ(y) ∈ (µ1(k),µ2(k)), firms offer w(y) = XH − k/µ(y) and choose ρ(y) = 1.
(iii) if µ(y) ∈ {µ1(k),µ2(k)}, firms offer w(y) = X L +µ(y)(XH − X L) = XH − k/µ(y) and













Figure 1: Illustration of Lemma 2
Figure 1 illustrates Lemma 2. Firms are indifferent between information acquisition
and non–acquisition for all combinations of wage w and belief µ(y) on the I–I line; above
the line they optimally choose information acquisition with probability ρ = 1 and below
the line with probability ρ = 0. Along the N–N line the expected profit from hiring an
applicant without information acquisition is zero; the expected profit is positive below
the line. Along the A–A line the expected profit from investing in information and hiring
only type H is zero; it is positive below the line. The upper envelope of the N–N and
the A–A line is the wage w(y) for education y offered under competition. This wage is
strictly increasing in µ(y). At this wage, not investing in information is strictly optimal
for the firms if µ(y)< µ1(k) or µ(y)> µ2(k) because their belief is relatively precise and
workers are highly likely to be either type H or L. Only for more diffuse beliefs µ(y) ∈
(µ1(k),µ2(k)) there is a high uncertainty regarding the workers’ types, so that firms are
forced under competition to audit their applicants. If µ(y) = µ1(k) or µ(y) = µ2(k), the
firms are indifferent between auditing or not at the competitive wage. In this situation
they optimally audit some arbitrary fraction ρ(y) ∈ [0,1] of applicants.
Lemmas 1 and 2 allow us to derive the utility of workers from choosing education y ,
given the belief µ(·) of firms. First consider type H. This type will never be rejected and
so he always receives the wage w(y) stated in the two Lemmas. Therefore, his utility is
UH(y|µ(y))≡
XH − k/µ(y)− cH(y) if k ≤ k˜ and µ(y) ∈ [µ1(k),µ2(k)],X L +µ(y)(XH − X L)− cH(y) otherwise. (5)
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Note that the utility of type H is strictly increasing in the belief µ(y).
In contrast, type L gets the wage w(y) only if he is not audited. After an audit he
is rejected and only gets X L − s. Therefore, his expected utility depends on the audit
probability ρ(y). This probability, however, is arbitrary when the parameter combination
in part (iii) of Lemma 2 applies. For our purposes, however, it is sufficient that for all
other parameter combinations the utility of type L is well–defined by
UL(y|µ(y))≡

X L − s− cL(y) if k ≤ k˜ and µ(y) ∈ (µ1(k),µ2(k)),
X L +µ(y)(XH − X L)− cL(y) if k ≤ k˜ and µ(y) /∈ [µ1(k),µ2(k)],
X L +µ(y)(XH − X L)− cL(y) if k > k˜.
(6)
4 Belief Refinements
As is well–known, signaling games have a disconcerting multiplicity of equilibria. The
reason is that the perfect Bayesian equilibrium in our context pins down the firms’ beliefs
only for equilibrium education choices. Therefore, multiple outcomes can be supported by
out–of–equilibrium beliefs that deter any deviating education choice by interpreting it as
a signal of low productivity. To rule out counterintuitive equilibria driven by such overly
pessimistic beliefs, the literature has adopted belief refinements that impose plausible
restrictions on out–of–equilibrium beliefs.
The standard refinement for Spence’s (1973) model of education signaling with two
types is the intuitive criterion of Cho and Kreps (1987). It yields a unique prediction in
the model of two worker types by ruling out pessimistic beliefs about their productivity
for certain out–of–equilibrium education choices. Let U∗L and U
∗
H denote the equilibrium
utility of type L and H, respectively. The idea of the intuitive criterion is that an out–of–
equilibrium education choice y should be considered as a signal of type H if – given this
belief – only type H has an incentive to deviate to y:
Condition A For any out–of–equilibrium education y, if
UH(y|1)> U∗H and UL(y|1)< U∗L (7)
then µ(y) = 1.
By the first inequality in (7), type H gains by choosing y if education y is interpreted
as a signal of productivity XH , whereas by the second inequality type L loses by choosing
y even when he is considered to have productivity XH . The intuitive criterion stipulates
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that in this situation education y is a convincing signal of productivity XH . Thus, when-
ever (7) holds for some out–of–equilibrium education y , the equilibrium does not satisfy
Condition A: type H would gain by deviating to y because UH(y|µ(y)) = UH(y|1)> U∗H .
The intuitive criterion is designed for signaling games without alternative sources of
information. As Bester and Ritzberger (2001) argue, it has the drawback that it fails to
generate incentives for information acquisition. This is so because it specifies determin-
istic beliefs restrictions. Yet, as we have seen in the previous section, firms will invest in
auditing only if their belief is sufficiently diffuse. Therefore, even with arbitrarily small
auditing costs, the intuitive criterion cannot induce information acquisition as a response
to a deviating education choice.15 To provide a more effective role for information ac-
quisition, Bester and Ritzberger (2001) propose an extension of the intuitive criterion.16
We apply a slight modification, because in (6) the type L’s utility UL(·) is not defined for
µ ∈ {µ1,µ2}:17
Condition B For any δ ∈ [0,1]\{µ1,µ2} and for any out–of–equilibrium education y, if
UH(y|δ)> U∗H and UL(y|δ)< U∗L (8)
then µ(y)≥ δ.
Condition B contains the intuitive criterion as the special case δ = 1. It extends the
idea of this criterion to a situation where a deviation to y is profitable only for type H
when the firms believe that the deviation originates from type L with probability δ. This
belief is already rather pessimistic, because it actually gives no incentive to type L to
deviate to y . In such a case Condition B requires that the firms’ belief should not be even
more pessimistic than δ. Thus, whenever (8) holds, the equilibrium violates Condition B,
because UH(y|µ(y)) ≥ UH(y|δ) > U∗H implies that type H would rather choose y than
the supposed equilibrium education.
5 Separating Equilibrium
An equilibrium is called separating if education choices reveal a worker’s type. Thus, the
firms’ beliefs for any education chosen in equilibrium are either zero or one, µ(y) ∈ {0, 1}
15Alternative refinements such as universal divinity in Banks (1992) and Condition D1 in Daley and
Green (2014), require off–equilibrium beliefs to put positive probability only on the type that is most likely
to defect from a given deviation. Like the intuitive criterion, such off–equilibrium beliefs are deterministic
and therefore cannot induce information acquisition.
16For a recent application, see Stahl and Strausz (2017).
17Note that this makes Condition B less restrictive.
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for all y contained in the support of workers’ equilibrium education choices. As shown
by Cho and Kreps (1987), the Spence (1973) model with two worker types has a unique
equilibrium that satisfies the intuitive criterion of Condition A. It is separating and has
the following properties: type L workers receive the wage X L and choose zero education;





H) = XH − X L. (9)
This is the least–cost separating equilibrium in the sense that y∗H is the lowest level of edu-
cation such that type L workers cannot gain from imitating the type H workers’ education
choice to receive the wage XH .
To investigate whether this outcome remains an equilibrium in our extension of
Spence’s (1973) setting, we define a critical audit cost k¯ by the condition that
k¯ = k˜ if cH(y
∗





with k˜ given by (2). Note that k¯ is uniquely defined as k/µ2(k) strictly increases in k ∈
[0, k˜], is equal to zero for k = 0 and k˜/µ2(k˜) = 2k˜. Further, k¯ < k˜ if cH(y∗H)< 2k˜.
To understand the role of k¯ for the equilibrium outcome, recall from the discussion
of Lemma 1 that k/µ(y) is the auditing cost passed through to type H workers if the
auditing cost is k and the firms’ belief is µ(y). Since µ2(k) is the largest possible belief
that induces an audit, k/µ2(k) is the minimum auditing cost borne by type H workers
if an audit takes place. In the second part of (10), k¯ is the critical value of k at which
this minimum auditing cost is exactly the same as the minimum education cost a type
H worker has to incur for the separating education y∗H . For any k < k¯, type H workers
are better off by bearing the expected audit cost than signaling by education y∗H , because
k/µ2(k)< cH(y∗H).
As the following proposition shows, the parameter k¯ is indeed critical for the existence
of a separating equilibrium under Condition B.
Proposition 1 (i) For all k, there exists a unique separating equilibrium satisfying condi-
tion A: type L workers receive a wage of X L and do not invest in education; type H workers
receive a wage of XH and choose education y
∗
H . Auditing does not occur in equilibrium. (ii)
The separating equilibrium satisfies Condition B if and only if k ≥ k¯.
As indicated above, the statement in part (i) of the proposition is shown already in Cho
and Kreps (1987) for a setting where the option of information acquisition is unavailable.
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To see that this equilibrium also persists for all k ≥ 0 if information acquisition is feasible,
simply define the firms’ beliefs as follows: µ(y) = 0 for all y < y∗H , and µ(y) = 1 for all
y ≥ y∗H . These beliefs are consistent with the equilibrium outcome and it is easily verified
that they satisfy Condition A. Also, with these beliefs it follows directly from Lemma 2 that
auditing occurs neither in equilibrium nor after out–of–equilibrium choices of y . Thus,
the equilibrium selected by Condition A is not affected by the feasibility of auditing. Even
when the auditing cost k is arbitrarily small, type H workers have to invest cH(y∗H) to
distinguish themselves from type L.
To complete the proof of Proposition 1, we show part (ii) by the following lemma:
Lemma 3 Suppose there is an equilibrium such that some type H workers choose education
y∗H and receive a wage of XH . (i) For all k < k¯, this equilibrium does not satisfy Condition B.
(ii) For all k ≥ k¯, this equilibrium satisfies Condition B if type L workers receive equilibrium
utility U∗L = X L.
Clearly, the equilibrium described in part (i) of Proposition 1 has all the properties
required in Lemma 3, and so this proves part (ii) of the proposition.
By part (i) of Lemma 3, the separating equilibrium does not survive Condition B if
k < k¯. The idea is that for some small out–of-equilibrium choice of education, there
always exists some belief δ that induces auditing, and given this belief, type H benefits
from such a deviation while type L loses from it due to auditing. By Condition B, such
deviation should be interpreted as originating from type H with probability no smaller
than δ. Given this belief, type H prefers such an audit-inducing deviation over y∗H because
the auditing cost passed through to him is relatively low in comparison to the signaling
cost associated with y∗H , thus destroying the separating equilibrium.
Part (ii) of Lemma 3 implies that if k ≥ k¯, the separating equilibrium satisfies Con-
dition B. The reason is that if there is any deviation that does not induce auditing and
is profitable for type H, such a deviation is also profitable for type L, and so there is no
violation of Condition B. If, however, a deviation induces auditing, it is never profitable
for type H because the audit cost passed through to him is too high in comparison to the
signaling cost from education y∗H . Thus, there exists no deviation and belief such that the
two inequalities in Condition B hold simultaneously, and therefore the separating equi-
librium cannot be eliminated by Condition B when k ≥ k¯.
Note that Lemma 3 not only applies to the separating equilibrium in Proposition 1, it
also applies to any equilibrium where some type H chooses y∗H and receives the wage XH .
We will use this insight later on in Lemma 6 for the analysis of pooling equilibria.
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6 Pooling Equilibrium
In a pooling equilibrium, some fractionσL > 0 of type L workers and some fractionσH > 0
of type H workers choose the same education y∗P and do not opt for the wage wL = X L.
Thus, the choice of y∗P does not fully reveal a worker’s type. We say that partial pooling
occurs at y∗P if σi < 1 for some i ∈ {L, H}; otherwise, ifσL = σH = 1, we have full pooling.
In a pooling equilibrium, the firms’ beliefs at y∗P are determined by Bayes’ rule as
µ(y∗P) =
σHλ
σL(1−λ) +σHλ ∈ (0, 1), (11)
because a fraction λ of all workers has type H. Therefore, by Lemmas 1 and 2, firms
offer a wage w(y∗P) ∈ (X L, XH) after observing education y∗P chosen by workers who have
not opted for the default wage wL = X L. To establish the conditions for existence of a
pooling equilibrium, we first derive some necessary properties of such an equilibrium in
the following Lemmas 4–6.
It is well–known from Cho and Kreps (1987) that pooling does not survive Condition A
in an environment without auditing. Indeed, the proof of the following lemma uses their
argument to show that auditing must take place at any pooling education y∗P with positive
probability.
Lemma 4 Suppose pooling occurs at y∗P in an equilibrium satisfying Condition A. Then k ≤ k˜
and the auditing probability satisfies ρ(y∗P) ∈ (0,1).
The intuition for why Condition A does not rule out pooling at y∗P is that type H
receives the wage w(y∗P) with certainty, while type L is rejected with probability ρ(y
∗
P).
Therefore, for type L the expected wage from education y∗P is less than w(y
∗
P) . This means
that the wage increase from deviating to a signal y such that µ(y) = 1 and w(y) = XH
is higher for type L than for type H. The presence of auditing in a pooling equilibrium,
therefore, makes it more costly for type H to distinguish himself by an education that
type L is not willing to imitate. In fact, as our analysis of pooling below shows, this
makes it unattractive for type H to deviate from y∗P to an education y that satisfies the
requirements of Condition A.
By Lemma 4 firms have to be indifferent between auditing and not auditing an ap-
plicant with education y∗P . As this is implied already by the weaker Condition A, it is
clearly also true under the stronger Condition B. Actually, the following result shows that
Lemma 4 in combination with Condition B uniquely determines the firms’ beliefs at y∗P .
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Lemma 5 Let k ≤ k˜ and suppose pooling occurs at y∗P in an equilibrium satisfying Condi-
tion B. Then µ(y∗P) = µ2(k) and so the firms offer the wage
w(y∗P) = X L +µ2(k)(XH − X L) = XH − k/µ2(k).
Recall from Lemma 2 that firms are indifferent between auditing or not only under
the beliefs µ(y) ∈ {µ1(k),µ2(k)}. Lemma 5 uses Condition B to rule out that firms hold
the more pessimistic belief µ(y∗P) = µ1(k) < 1/2 in a pooling equilibrium. Indeed, for
pessimistic beliefs with µ(y∗P) < 1/2, type H can benefit by deviating to some education
level y ′ > y∗P which induces a more optimistic but also more diffuse belief. Under this
belief firms audit with probability one so that only type H gains from deviating to y ′. As
a result, firms must hold the belief µ(y∗P) = µ2(k)≥ 1/2 in a pooling equilibrium.
Lemma 5 also implies that pooling cannot occur at more than one education choice. To
see this, note that by the lemma the wage w(y∗P) is the same for any pooling education y
∗
P .
Since workers of type H are always hired after applying for w(y∗P), it cannot be optimal
for them to choose different educations with different costs to receive the wage w(y∗P).
The following result restricts the choices of education that can occur in a pooling
equilibrium:
Lemma 6 Suppose pooling occurs at y∗P in an equilibrium satisfying Condition B. (i) Then
there is no education y > 0 chosen only by type L workers and at most one education yˆH > 0
chosen only by type H workers. (ii) For all k < k¯, y∗P = 0 and σi = 1 for at least one type
i ∈ {L, H}.
For k < k¯, Lemma 6 rules out pooling equilibria that satisfy Condition B and involve
partial pooling by both types. As a consequence, there remain three categories as candi-
dates for a pooling equilibrium. First, in an equilibrium withσL ∈ (0,1) and σH = 1 there
is partial pooling only by type L workers. These have to be indifferent between opting








P) (X L − s) . (12)
As w(y∗P) is given by Lemma 5, this equation uniquely determines the likelihood ρ(y
∗
P) ∈
(0,1) of being audited when applying for w(y∗P). Further, as µ(y
∗
P) = µ2(k), Bayes’ rule
in (11) determines σL.
Second, there is partial pooling only by type H workers if σH ∈ (0, 1) and σL = 1.
This means that type L at least weakly prefers applying for w(y∗P), and being audited with
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probability ρ(y∗P), over opting for wL = X L. Also, type H must be indifferent between







P) (X L − s) , w(y∗P) = XH − cH( yˆH). (13)
Note that the second condition uniquely determines the education level yˆH . As an addi-
tional equilibrium requirement, type L should have no incentive to choose yˆH . In fact,
by Condition A, it is easy to see that he has to be indifferent between applying for w(y∗P)
and choosing yˆH to obtain the wage XH : if type L strictly preferred applying for w(y∗P)
over choosing yˆH , then type H could appeal to the intuitive criterion of Condition A that
also an education choice slightly below yˆH should be considered as a convincing signal of





P) (X L − s) = XH − cL( yˆH). (14)
This equation determines ρ(y∗P). Again, we can use Bayes’ rule to derive the equilibrium
value of σH .
Third, σL = σH = 1 in an equilibrium with full pooling. Actually, full pooling can
occur only under non–generic parameter combinations: by Bayes’ rule and Lemma 5, full
pooling requires that µ2(k) = λ. Thus, for a given audit cost k, full pooling is possible
at most for a single value of λ. Full pooling can be viewed as a limit case σL → 1 of the
first category so that the auditing probability is determined by (12). Alternatively, it can
be viewed as the limiting case σH → 1 of the second equilibrium category such that (13)
and (14) hold, but in fact yˆH is not chosen by type H.
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The following proposition shows how the category of pooling equilibrium depends on
the cost k of information acquisition and the fractionλ of type H workers in the population
of workers, as illustrated in Figure 2.
Proposition 2 Let k < k¯. Then there exists a unique pooling equilibrium satisfying Condi-
tion B and, therefore, also Condition A.19 More specifically:
(i) if λ > µ2(k), then some fraction σH ∈ (0, 1) of type H workers chooses y∗P = 0 and the
remaining fraction chooses an education yˆH ∈ (0, y∗H). All type L workers choose y∗P .
(ii) if λ= µ2(k), then all workers of both types choose y∗P = 0.
18Since (12) and (14) have different solutions for ρ(y∗P), the auditing rate is not uniquely determined
under full pooling. Any ρ(y∗P) between the solutions of (12) and (14) can support full pooling.







Figure 2: Illustration of Proposition 2
(iii) if λ < µ2(k), then some fraction σL ∈ (0, 1) of type L workers chooses y∗P = 0 and the
remaining fraction applies for wL. All type H workers choose y
∗
P = 0.
For all k > k¯ a pooling equilibrium satisfying Condition B does not exist.
As Figure 2 shows, parts (i) and (ii) of the proposition only apply for λ sufficiently
large. Indeed, µ2(.) is a decreasing function with µ2(0) = 1 and µ2(k)≥ 1/2 for all k ≤ k¯.
Thus, if k is small enough or if λ ≤ 1/2, the equilibrium is always as described in part
(iii).
The refinement of Condition B selects pooling as the unique equilibrium for k < k¯. For
these values of k, the wage w(y∗P) = XH − k/µ2(k) is more attractive for type H workers
than their payoff XH − cH(y∗H) in the separating equilibrium.20 Therefore, competition
among the firms induces pooling of workers at the wage offer w(y∗P). At the same time,
firms have to hold the belief µ(y∗P) = µ2(k) to be willing to audit applicants with some
probability ρ(y∗P) ∈ (0, 1). Interestingly, as y∗P = 0, education as a signal is not used in
equilibrium if λ ≤ µ2(k), i.e. if k is small enough. Low costs of information acquisition
eliminate signaling by education.
The requirement µ(y∗P) = µ2(k) determines the equilibrium fraction σi of type i work-
ers who apply for w(y∗P). Full pooling is consistent with the belief µ(y
∗
P) = µ2(k) only in
the boundary case λ = µ2(k). Otherwise, there can be only partial pooling. In particu-
lar, if λ > µ2(k), it cannot be the case that all type H workers apply for w(y∗P) because
then Bayes’ rule would imply that µ(y∗P) > µ2(k) and firms would not invest in informa-
tion acquisition. Therefore, some fraction of type H workers has to engage in signaling
20In addition, k is small enough for µ2(k) to be well–defined.
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by education yˆH . Conversely, if λ < µ2(k), there cannot be an equilibrium such that all
type L workers apply for w(y∗P), because then µ(y
∗
P) < µ2(k) by Bayes’ rule. In this case,
therefore, some type L workers have to opt for the default wage wL.
The following proposition summarizes the comparative statics properties of the pool-
ing equilibrium.
Proposition 3 Let k < k¯. Then the pooling equilibrium in Proposition 2 has the following
properties:
(i) if λ > µ2(k), then σL = 1, σH is decreasing and ρ(y∗P) is increasing in k. Further, yˆH
increases in k and decreases in type H workers’ education costs.21
(ii) if λ < µ2(k), then σH = 1, σL is increasing and ρ(y∗P) is decreasing in k. Further,
limk→0 σL = 0 and limk→0 ρ(y∗P) = (XH − X L)/(XH − X L + s) ∈ (0, 1).
In the pooling equilibrium, the firms’ beliefs have to satisfy µ(y∗P) = µ2(k), which is
decreasing in k. For λ > µ2(k), therefore, a smaller fraction of type H workers needs to
pool at y∗P to keep the belief consistent with Bayes’ rule when k increases. Analogously,
for λ < µ2(k), a larger fraction of type L is required to pool at y∗P to keep the firms’
belief consistent. As µ2(0) = 1, in the limit k → 0 applications by type L for w(y∗P)
tend to zero. Obviously, this requires the auditing rate to be bounded away from zero
in this limit. Indeed, the auditing rate tends to unity for k → 0 if the cost of a renewed
application s becomes negligible. This keeps type L workers from applying for the pooling
wage w(y∗P)> wL = X L for k→ 0 and s→ 0.
The comparative statics of the auditing rate depend on the equilibrium category. The
reason is that the indifference condition for type L differs between the categories. For
λ > µ2(k), (14) requires type L to be indifferent between applying for w(y∗p) and imitating
the type H ’s education yˆH . As k increases, XH − cL( yˆP) decreases faster than w(y∗P), and
so ρ(y∗P) is increasing in k. In contrast, for λ < µ2(k), the firms’ auditing rate in (12) has
to make type L indifferent between applying for w(y∗P) and opting for the default wage
X L. If k increases, w(y∗P) decreases, and type L workers need to be audited less frequently
to stay indifferent.
Interestingly, the equilibrium education yˆH in part (i) of the proposition depends on
the education costs of type H workers. This contrasts with the standard result in (9) that
without auditing type H workers’ education costs do not matter for their equilibrium ed-
ucation. With auditing, however, more expensive education lowers the education level
21We say that type H workers’ education costs increase if the new education costs are larger than the
initial education costs for all education levels: cNewH (y)> cH(y) for all y > 0.
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necessary to make type H workers indifferent between the lower wage without education
and the higher separation wage with education. Type L workers remain in the pooling
contract as their utilities increase due to a lower auditing probability. If instead the audit-
ing costs decrease, less type H workers obtain an education and the amount of education
obtained decreases. Hence, the lower the auditing costs, the less signaling by education
occurs. The reason is that lower auditing costs make auditing more attractive for firms.
Therefore, more type H workers choose pooling and forgo any education without reduc-
ing firms’ incentives to audit. At the same time, lower auditing costs imply higher wages
for any contracts involving audits. Thus, less education is required to make type H work-
ers indifferent between the higher separation wage with that education and the lower
wage without education.
7 Discussion
In this section we discuss some implications and extensions of our analysis.
The limit k→ 0 Under perfect information about workers’ productivities, each worker
receives a wage equal to his productivity without signaling by education or costly audit-
ing. It seems a reasonable conjecture that the equilibrium under asymmetric information
resembles the perfect information outcome for sufficiently small costs of information ac-
quisition. Yet, as part (i) of Proposition 1 shows, this is not true if merely Condition A
is assumed. We now show, however, that the conjecture holds under the stronger Con-
dition B. Recall that for k < k¯, a separating equilibrium satisfying Condition B does not
exist, while the pooling equilibrium as described in Proposition 2 survives. The follow-
ing result shows that workers’ equilibrium payoffs approach the outcome under perfect
information when auditing costs become negligible.
Proposition 4 Let k < k¯. Then the pooling equilibrium in Proposition 2 has the following
property: in the limit k → 0, the belief µ(y∗P) tends to unity and the payoffs of type H
and type L workers become identical to their payoffs under perfect information. That is
limk→0 U∗H = XH and limk→0 U
∗
L = X L.
In the separating equilibrium under Condition A, workers of type H invest cH(y∗H) in
education independently of k. Condition B yields the more plausible implication that in
the limit k → 0 the perfect information equilibrium is obtained. In this limit, auditing
occurs with positive probability by part (ii) of Proposition 3; but this does not reduce
welfare because auditing costs are zero in the limit.
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Welfare Next, we address the welfare implications of information acquisition. If audit-
ing is impossible, or equivalently, if it is too costly as k > k¯, then Proposition 1 describes
the outcome under Condition B: in the separating equilibrium without audits, workers of
type H get the utility XH − cH(y∗H) and workers of type L get X L. If, however, auditing is
feasible and k < k¯, the equilibrium selected by Condition B is the pooling equilibrium in
Proposition 2. As the following proposition shows, for all k < k¯ this equilibrium yields a
Pareto–improvement relative to the separating equilibrium.
Proposition 5 Let k < k¯. Then in the pooling equilibrium in Proposition 2 the utilities of
workers, U∗H and U
∗
L , have the following properties:
(i) if λ > µ2(k), then U∗H > XH − cH(y∗H) and U∗L > X L. Further, U∗H and U∗L are decreasing
in k.
(ii) if λ < µ2(k), then U∗H > XH − cH(y∗H) and U∗L = X L. Further, U∗H is decreasing in k.
Interestingly, as part (i) of the proposition shows, not only type H but also type L
workers may gain from the feasibility of information acquisition: if λ > µ2(k), high pro-
ductivity workers subsidize workers of low productivity. This happens in the pooling
equilibrium because for these parameter values some fraction 1−σH of type H workers
does not pool with type L but chooses some education yˆH < y
∗
H . Type L’s payoff from
choosing education yˆH and getting the wage XH is higher than X L. Therefore, to keep
him from deviating to yˆH , his expected payoff from pooling must be higher than X L.
Binding wage offers In our model, firms make non–binding wage announcements at
stage (iii). In particular, they can reject any application at stage (v). Now suppose that
firms can make also binding wage offer at stage (iii) in addition to non–binding wage
announcements. Thus, they have to hire any applicant who applies for such a binding
wage offer. Notice that a firm will never audit applicants for a binding wage offer, because
it cannot make use of the acquired information. Does this modification of the model affect
the equilibria determined in Propositions 1 and 2?
Proposition 6 Suppose firms can make binding wage offers. Then Propositions 1 and 2 are
still valid.
Binding wage offers do not change the equilibria we discussed above. Further, binding
wage offers cannot create new equilibria. This follows directly from Lemma 4, which
shows that the intuitive criterion does not allow for any equilibrium contracts with pooling
and no audits.
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Default wage In our model, firms offer the default wage wL = X L even before work-
ers take education decisions. This may look a bit unusual from the perspective of the
standard signaling by education model, where all wage offers are made after education
choices. But this only serves to simplify the specification of the firms’ beliefs. Without
this simplification we would have to make the firms’ beliefs contingent not only on the
observed education choice but also on the wage for which a worker applies. Recall that in
part (iii) of Proposition 2 some fraction of type L workers pools with type H at education
y∗P = 0 and applies for w(y
∗
P) > wL = X L, while the remaining fraction applies for the
default wage wL = X L. In this equilibrium, workers distinguish themselves not by educa-
tion but only by the wage they apply for. To support this outcome as an equilibrium when
all wage offers are made after education choices, one can specify beliefs in the following
way: Irrespective of the chosen education, firms believe that a worker has type L if he
applies for a wage offer w≤ X L. Clearly, it is not optimal for the firms to audit applicants
for w ≤ X L. If a worker applies for a wage offer w(y) > X L beliefs are specified as in the
above analysis. These beliefs effectively replicate the availability of the default wage wL:
in equilibrium firms compete for low productivity workers by offering the wage X L and
they accept all applicants for this wage.
8 Conclusions
In signaling models à la Spence (1973), firms can only infer workers’ productivities from
their education choices. In reality, firms additionally use costly auditing to learn workers’
productivities. We characterize the trade–offs between workers’ signaling incentives and
firms’ information acquisition incentives. Under an extension of the intuitive criterion,
there exists a unique equilibrium: it involves separation for large auditing costs and partial
pooling for small auditing costs. For sufficiently small auditing costs, all workers pool at
zero education. Thus, education as a signal is not used in equilibrium for low costs of
information acquisition. With vanishing costs the partial pooling equilibrium becomes
more and more informative and approaches the perfect-information outcome.
Our analysis considers the role of auditing in a signaling environment, in which the
informed agents move first by choosing a signal. An alternative setting is the screening
model developed by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). In this setting the uninformed players
first announce offers, and then each informed type chooses among offers. In the labor
market context of our paper this would mean that firms compete by making education
contingent wage offers. Then each worker chooses the offer which is best for him and
acquires the required education. Our analysis of information acquisition could be applied
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to such an environment by assuming that firms make offers but maintain the right to
audit applicants before taking hiring decisions. It seems reasonable that auditing will
occur also in a screening version of our model if audit costs are small enough. But, it is
an open question how this affects screening by education in equilibrium.
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Appendix
This Appendix contains the proofs of Lemmas 1–6 and of Propositions 2–6. The proof of
Proposition 1 is substantiated in the main text.
Proof of Lemma 1: Obviously, no firm offers a wage w > XH to employ workers at
this wage. Consider any wage w ∈ (X L, XH]. If the firm audits an applicant, its profit is
µ(y)(XH −w)− k, because after the audit it will optimally reject type L and hire type H.
Hiring an applicant without an audit gives the profit µ(y)XH+(1−µ(y))X L−w. Therefore
the firm’s profit is
Π≡max [µ(y)(XH −w)− k,µ(y)XH + (1−µ(y))X L −w] . (15)
Bertrand competition implies that Π= 0. Therefore,
w(y) = max [XH − k/µ(y),µ(y)XH + (1−µ(y))X L] . (16)
Suppose that ρ(y)> 0. Then XH − k/µ(y)≥ µ(y)XH + (1−µ(y))X L, which implies
k ≤ µ(y)(1−µ(y)(XH − X L)≤ k˜, (17)
where the second inequality holds because µ(y)(1−µ(y) attains its maximum at µ(y) =
1/2. Since (17) yields a contradiction to k > k˜, this proves Lemma 1.
Finally, at any wage w ≤ X L firms optimally accept all applicants without an audit.
Therefore, Bertrand competition implies w(y) = µ(y)XH + (1 − µ(y))X L ≥ X L. This is
only consistent with w≤ X L for µ(y) = 0 and w(y) = X L. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2: By the proof of Lemma 1, the equilibrium wage offer is given by (16).
Further, the argument in Lemma 1 shows that ρ(y) = 0 if the first inequality in (17) is
violated. Since µ(y)(1− µ(y)) is strictly concave in µ(y), k > µ(y)(1− µ(y))(XH − X L)
is equivalent to µ(y) /∈ [µ1(k),µ2(k)]. This proves part (i).
Part (ii) follows by an analogous argument, because acquisition of information is opti-
mal if k < µ(y)(1−µ(y))(XH −X L), which is equivalent to µ(y) ∈ (µ1(k),µ2(k)). Finally,
part (iii) holds because firms are indifferent between acquiring and not acquiring infor-
mation if k = µ(y)(1 − µ(y))(XH − X L), which is equivalent to µ(y) ∈ {µ1(k),µ2(k)}.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 3: (i) Suppose that for k < k¯ there is an equilibrium with the properties
stated in the lemma that satisfies Condition B. Then, by definition of k¯ in (10), cH(y∗H)−
k/µ2(k)> 0 because k/µ2(k) is increasing in k and hence k/µ2(k)< k¯/µ2(k¯). Therefore,
there must exist an out–of–equilibrium education y ′ > 0 close enough to zero such that
cH(y
′)< cH(y∗H)− k/µ2(k). (18)
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Suppose a worker chooses education y ′ and firms’ beliefs are δ = µ2(k)− ε′ with ε′ > 0.
Then, for ε′ sufficiently small, δ ∈ (µ1(k),µ2(k)). Therefore, by (5) and (6),
UH(y
′|δ) = XH − k
µ2(k)− ε′ − cH(y
′), UL(y ′|δ) = X L − s− cL(y ′). (19)
Because in equilibrium type H chooses y∗H and receives the wage XH and type L can always
apply for wL = X L, we have
U∗H = XH − cH(y∗H), U∗L ≥ X L. (20)
For ε′ sufficiently small, therefore (18)–(20) imply that
UH(y
′|δ)> U∗H , UL(y ′|δ)< U∗L . (21)
By Condition B, therefore, µ(y ′) ≥ δ. Since UH(y ′|µ) is increasing in µ, we thus obtain
by (21) that UH(y ′|µ(y ′))≥ UH(y ′|δ)> U∗H , a contradiction to type H workers optimally
choosing y∗H in equilibrium.
(ii) We show that (8) cannot hold if k ≥ k¯, which means that Condition B does not
apply. Since this condition imposes no restrictions for beliefs δ ∈ {µ1(k),µ2(k)}, we
consider only beliefs δ /∈ {µ1(k),µ2(k)}. This implies that ρ(y ′) ∈ {0, 1} for an out–of–
equilibrium choice y ′. First consider the case ρ(y ′) = 1. By Lemmas 1 and 2 this requires
that k ∈ [k¯, k˜] and δ ∈ (µ1(k),µ2(k)). Note that, for any education y ′ and any k ∈ [k¯, k˜]
cH(y
′)≥ 0≥ cH(y∗H)− kµ2(k) . (22)
As δ < µ2(k), we obtain by (5) that
UH(y
′|δ) = XH − k
δ
− cH(y ′)< XH − k
µ2(k)
− cH(y ′)≤ XH − cH(y∗H) = U∗H , (23)
where the last inequality follows from (22). This shows that the first inequality in (8)
cannot hold.
Now consider the case where ρ(y ′) = 0 given the belief δ after observing y ′. Then,
by Lemmas 1 and 2, the first inequality in (8) is equivalent to
UH(y
′|δ) = X L +δ(XH − X L)− cH(y ′)> U∗H = XH − cH(y∗H). (24)
Further, by U∗L = X L and the definition of y
∗
H in (9), the second inequality in (8) requires
that
UL(y





H)− cH(y ′)> (1−δ)(XH − X L)> cL(y∗H)− cL(y ′). (26)
As (1−δ)(XH − X L)≥ 0, y∗H > y ′ by the first inequality. Therefore, (26) implies that
cH(y
∗









Since this contradicts the assumption in (1) that c′L(y) > c
′
H(y) > 0, this shows that (8)
in Condition B cannot hold. Q.E.D.









P)< XH , there exists a y
′ > y∗P such that
UH(y
′|1) = XH − cH(y ′)> U∗H and UL(y ′|1) = XH − cL(y ′)< U∗L . (29)
Therefore, Condition A implies that µ(y ′) = 1. But then the first inequality in (29) implies
that all H types would choose y ′ rather than y∗P , a contradiction.
Suppose that ρ(y∗P) = 1. Then U
∗
L = X L−s−cL(y∗P), because type L is always detected.
But, by applying for the default wage wL = X L, type L can ensure himself the utility
X L > U
∗
L , a contradiction.
As ρ(y∗P) > 0, it follows from Lemma 1 that k ≤ k˜, because firms will never invest in
information acquisition if k > k˜. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 5: By Lemmas 2 and 4, we obtain that µ(y∗P) ∈ {µ1(k),µ2(k)}. If k = k˜,
then µ1(k) = µ2(k), which proves the Lemma. Now consider the case k < k˜, where
µ1(k)< µ2(k), and suppose µ(y∗P) = µ1(k). Then the equilibrium utilities satisfy
U∗H = XH − k/µ1(k)− cH(y∗P), U∗L ≥ X L. (30)
Consider out–of–equilibrium education y∗P +ε and the belief δ = (µ1(k)+µ2(k))/2. Since
δ ∈ (µ1(k),µ2(k)), with this belief the firms will choose ρ = 1 and so
UH(y
′|δ) = XH − k
δ
− cH(y∗P + ε), UL(y ′|δ) = X L − s− cL(y∗P + ε). (31)
Since δ > µ1(k) we obtain for ε sufficiently small that (8) applies and so Condition B
implies that µ(y ′) ≥ δ. Thus, UH(y ′|µ(y ′)) ≥ UH(y ′|δ) > U∗H , a contradiction to the
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Proof of Lemma 6: (i) Suppose there is a y > 0 chosen only by type L workers. Then
w(y) = X L and so their utility is X L − cL(y) < X L. As type L can opt for wL = X L, this
yields a contradiction. Suppose there are two education levels 0 < y ′ < y ′′ chosen only
by type H. Then w(y ′) = w(y ′′) = XH and so cH(y ′) < cH(y ′′) yields a contradiction to
y ′′ being optimal for type H.
(ii) Suppose y∗P > 0. Then the equilibrium utilities satisfy
U∗H = XH − k/µ2(k)− cH(y∗P), U∗L ≥ X L. (32)
Consider the out–of–equilibrium education y ′ > 0 and some belief δ ∈ (µ1(k),µ2(k)) so
that with this belief the firms will choose ρ(y ′) = 1. Then for δ sufficiently close to µ2(k)
and y ′ sufficiently close to zero we have
UH(y
′|δ) = XH − k
δ
− cH(y ′)> U∗H , UL(y ′|δ) = X L − s− cL(y ′)< X L ≤ U∗L . (33)
Therefore Condition B implies that µ(y ′) ≥ δ. Thus, UH(y ′|µ(y ′)) ≥ UH(y ′|δ) > U∗H , a
contradiction to the equilibrium requirement that choosing y∗P is optimal for type H. This
implies that y∗P = 0.
Suppose σL ∈ (0, 1) and σH ∈ (0,1). Then some fraction 1 − σL of type L workers
apply for wL = X L and some fraction 1−σH of type H workers choose some yˆH to receive
the wage w( yˆH) = XH . This requires that type L cannot gain from choosing yˆH :
X L ≥ XH − cL( yˆH). (34)
Thus, yˆH ≥ y∗H by (9). If yˆH > y∗H , the inequality in (34) is strict. It is easily verified,
that then yˆH does not satisfy Condition A, which is implied by Condition B. Therefore,
yˆH = y∗H . For k < k¯, this yields a contradiction to part (i) of Lemma 3. Thus, for all
k < k¯, σL ∈ (0, 1) and σH ∈ (0,1) cannot hold simultaneously in a pooling equilibrium
satisfying condition B. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2: (i) If λ > µ2(k) = µ(y∗P), Bayes’ rule in (11) implies that σH <
σL. Therefore, by part (ii) of Lemma 6, σH ∈ (0, 1) and σL = 1. Thus, (13) and (14)
have to hold. Since w(y∗P) = XH − k/µ2(k) by Lemma 5, the second condition in (13) is
equivalent to cH( yˆH) = k/µ2(k). Since k/µ2(k) is increasing in k and k < k¯, we obtain
from (10) that cH( yˆH)< cH(y∗H). Therefore, yˆH < y
∗
H . This implies by (9) that
XH − cL( yˆH)> XH − cL(y∗H) = X L. (35)
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Therefore the first condition in (13) is implied by (14). Finally, as w(y∗P) = XH− cH( yˆH)>
XH − cL( yˆH) and X L − s < X L < XH − cL( yˆH), (14) has a unique solution ρ(y∗P) ∈ (0, 1).
This proves that the equilibrium conditions (13) and (14) are satisfied for unique values
of w(y∗P), yˆH and ρ(y
∗
P).
The equilibrium can be supported by beliefs µ(y) = µ2(k) for y < yˆH , and µ(y) = 1
for y ≥ yˆH . To see that these beliefs satisfy Condition B, note that type H certainly cannot
gain by choosing some y ′ > yˆH because his equilibrium payoff is XH−cH( yˆH). Suppose he
could gain by deviating to some y ′ ∈ (0, yˆH). Then the wage for workers with education
y ′ has to satisfy w(y ′) > w(y∗P). This requires the belief µ(y
′) > µ2(k), which implies
that ρ(y ′) = 0. This means that also type L will be hired at w(y ′) after choosing y ′. By
(13) type H gains from choosing y ′ if w(y ′)− cH(y ′) > XH − cH( yˆ). But, because by (1)
cH( yˆ)− cH(y ′) < cL( yˆ)− cL(y ′), this implies w(y ′)− cL(y ′) > XH − cL( yˆ). Therefore, by
(14) also type L would gain by choosing y ′. This proves that the equilibrium survives
Condition B.
(ii) If λ = µ2(k) = µ(y∗P), Bayes’ rule in (11) implies that σH = σL. Therefore, by
part (ii) of Lemma 6, σL = σH = 1. This is simply the limiting case of (i) and the same
arguments as above can be applied.
(iii) If λ < µ2(k) = µ(y∗P), Bayes’ rule in (11) implies that σH > σL. Therefore, by
part (ii) of Lemma 6, σL ∈ (0, 1) and σH = 1. Thus, (12) has to hold. This uniquely
determines ρ(y∗P). The equilibrium can be supported by the belief µ(y) = µ2(k) for all y .
To show that Condition B is not violated, suppose that type H could gain by deviating to
some y ′ > 0. Then the wage for education y ′ has to satisfy w(y ′) > w(y∗P), which by the
argument above implies also type L will be hired at w(y ′) after choosing y ′. For type H
to gain, it has to be the case that
w(y ′)− cH(y ′)> w(y∗P) = XH − kµ2(k) ≥ XH − cH(y
∗
H), (36)
where the last inequality holds by (10) because k < k¯ and k/µ2(k) is increasing in k. Note
that this implies y ′ < y∗H because w(y
′) ≤ XH . For type L to lose from deviating to y ′, it
has to be the case that
w(y ′)− cL(y ′)< X L = XH − cL(y∗H), (37)
where the equality holds by definition of y∗H in (9). By (36) and (37), cH(y
∗
H)− cH(y ′) >
cL(y∗H) − cL(y ′), a contradiction to assumption (1). This proves that (8) in Condition B
cannot hold.
The arguments in (i)–(iii) show that for all k < k¯ there exists a unique pooling equilib-
rium satisfying Condition B. Suppose that an equilibrium with pooling at some education
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y∗P exists also for k > k¯. By Lemma 4 this impliesρ(y
∗
P) ∈ (0, 1) and therefore, by Lemma 1
it has to be the case that k ≤ k˜. For k > k¯, k/µ2(k)> cH(y∗H) by (10). Therefore, for ε > 0
sufficiently small, the type H ’s equilibrium utility satisfies
U∗H = XH − k/µ2(k)< XH − cH(y∗H + ε) (38)
by Lemma 5. Since type L can always apply for wL = X L, by (9) we have
U∗L ≥ X L = XH − cL(y∗H)> XH − cL(y∗H + ε). (39)
Thus for the education y∗H + ε the inequalities in (7) are satisfied, which by Condition A
implies µ(y∗H +ε) = 1. But then by (38), type H would deviate to y
∗
H +ε. This proves that
for k > k¯ already Condition A, which is weaker than Condition B, precludes the existence
of a pooling equilibrium. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3: (i) If λ > µ2(k) = µ(y∗P), σL = 1 by Proposition 2 (i) and so (11)
yields
σH = (1−λ)µ2(k)/λ(1−µ2(k)). (40)
As µ′2(k) < 0, this proves that ∂ σH/∂ k < 0. The auditing rate ρ(y
∗
P) is determined by


























because cH( yˆH) = k/µ2(k) by the definition of yˆH in (13). Therefore the left-hand side
increases in k. As both sides of the equation are positive, this implies that ρ(y∗P) increases
in k.
The education yˆH obtained by some type H workers is determined by the indifference
condition XH−k/µ2(k) = XH−cH( yˆH). Hence, yˆH decreases as type H workers’ education
costs increase as defined in footnote 21. In addition, yˆH increases in k, because k/µ2(k)
increases in k. Hence, the amount of education yˆH increases in auditing costs k.
(ii) If λ < µ2(k) = µ(y∗P), σH = 1 by Proposition 2 (iii) and so (11) yields
σL = λ(1−µ2(k))/(1−λ)µ2(k) (43)
As µ′2(k) < 0, this proves that ∂ σL/∂ k > 0. Since limk→0µ2(k) = 1, we obtain
limk→0σL = 0. By (12) and Lemma 5
ρ(y∗P) =
XH − X L − k/µ2(k)
XH − X L − k/µ2(k) + s . (44)
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Since k/µ2(k) increases in k, ρ(y∗P) decreases in k. Moreover, the limit of ρ(y
∗
P) for k→ 0
is as stated in the proposition because limk→0 k/µ2(k) = 0. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4: First, notice that µ(y∗P) = µ2(k) and that in the limit
limk→0 µ2(k) = 1 and hence, λ < µ2(k) for k → 0. Proposition 2 (iii) shows U∗H =
w(y∗P) = XH−k/µ2(k) and U∗L = X L by equation (12). Therefore limk→0 U∗H = limk→0 XH−
k/µ2(k) = XH and limk→0 U∗L = X L. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5: (i) Suppose λ > µ2(k). Proposition 2 (i) proves that U∗H =
XH− cH( yˆH) and yˆH < y∗H . Therefore, U∗H = XH− cH( yˆH)> XH− cH(y∗H). In addition, yˆH is
determined by cH( yˆH) = k/µ2(k) according to the proof of Proposition 2 (i). Since µ2(k)
decreases and k/µ2(k) increases in k, yˆH increases and U∗H = XH − cH( yˆH) decreases in k.
Proposition 2 (i) also proves that U∗L is determined by (14) and, hence, U
∗
L = XH −
cL( yˆH). Recall the definition of y∗H with X L = XH − cL(y∗H). Therefore, yˆH < y∗H implies
U∗L = XH − cL( yˆH)> XH − cL(y∗H) = X L and U∗L decreases in k, because yˆH increases in k.
(ii) Suppose λ < µ2(k). Proposition 2 (iii) proves U∗H = w(y
∗
P) = XH − k/µ2(k).
The definition of k¯ implies k¯/µ2(k¯) ≤ cH(y∗H). Since k/µ2(k) increases in k and k < k¯,
U∗H = XH − k/µ2(k) > XH − k¯/µ2(k¯) = XH − cH(y∗H). Moreover, U∗H = XH − k/µ2(k)
decreases in k. Proposition 2 (iii) also proves that U∗L is determined by (12). Therefore,
U∗L = X L. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6: In the fully separating equilibrium of Proposition 1, there are no
audits in equilibrium. Hence, for k ≥ k¯ it does not matter whether wage offers are binding
or non–binding. The reasoning of Lemma 3 is also unaffected by additional binding wage
offers.
Suppose for k < k¯ there is an additional equilibrium besides the one in Proposition 2
with a binding offer w(y ′) for some education y ′ inducing the belief µ(y ′). By Lemma 2
there are no audits even for non–binding wage offers if µ(y ′) /∈ [µ1(k),µ2(k)]. Thus,
binding offers with µ(y ′) /∈ [µ1(k),µ2(k)] are effectively already included in our analysis
leading to Proposition 2. This implies that µ(y ′) ∈ [µ1(k),µ2(k)] and so µ(y ′) ∈ (0, 1).
Yet, as Lemma 4 shows, pooling at some y ′ implies that auditing occurs with probability
ρ(y ′) > 0. Because auditing is never optimal for a binding offer, this means that w(y ′)
cannot be an equilibrium offer. Consequently, for k < k¯ there cannot be an additional
equilibrium with a binding wage offer.
Next, we verify that the pooling equilibrium in Proposition 2 remains an equilibrium
by arguing that the firm has no incentive to deviate to make a binding wage offer at
stage (iii). Begin with the case λ = µ2(k). All workers choose education yP = 0 and
beliefs are µ(yP) = µ2(k). If the firm deviates by making a binding wage offer below
29
XH − k/µ2(k), the deviation attracts only type L workers, if it attracts any workers at
all, and the deviation is unprofitable. If the binding wage offer is above or equal to
XH−k/µ2(k), the deviation attracts all types of workers, but the deviation is unprofitable,
because by the definition of µ2(k)
k = µ2(k)(1−µ2(k))(XH − X L)⇔ k/µ2(k) = (1−µ2(k))(XH − X L)⇔
X L +µ2(k)(XH − X L) = XH − k/µ2(k)
Hence, the average productivity cannot exceed the deviation wage and the deviation is
unprofitable for the firm.
Now turn to the case λ < µ2(k). All workers choose the default contract or education
yP = 0 and beliefs are µ(yP) = µ2(k). If the binding wage offer is below XH−k/µ2(k), the
deviation attracts only type L workers, if it attracts any workers at all, and the deviation
is unprofitable. If the binding wage offer is above or equal to XH − k/µ2(k), the deviation
attracts all types of workers, but the deviation is unprofitable, due to the definition of
µ2(k) as above.
Finally, consider the case λ > µ2(k). Some type H workers choose education yˆH ,
all remaining workers choose education yP = 0 and beliefs are µ(yP) = µ2(k). If a
firm offers a binding wage for education yˆH , such a deviation is unprofitable, because
a binding wage that is attractive for workers with yˆH must attract type L workers as well.
If a firm offers a binding wage for education yP and the binding wage offer is below
XH − k/µ2(k), the deviation attracts only type L workers, if it attracts any workers at all,
and the deviation is unprofitable. If the binding wage offer for education yP is above
or equal to XH − k/µ2(k), the deviation attracts all types of workers with education yP ,
but the deviation is unprofitable, due to the definition of µ2(k) as above. The deviation
does not attract any workers with education yˆH , as long as the wage is below XH , because
education costs are sunk. Q.E.D.
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